11.4 Enforcement

The other cornerstone of the modern OHS regime is government regulation and enforcement. Government legislation is intended to complement the IRS by establishing safety standards and practices and intervening in cases when employers fail to meet them. Essentially, state enforcement is designed to address instances where the IRS system fails to result in safe workplaces. In practice, OHS enforcement has evolved to reinforce the employer-dominated IRS rather than regulate its operation.

Governments mostly rely upon complaint-driven enforcement wherein workplace inspections are triggered by individual complaints or in response to incidents (i.e., a serious injury or fatality). Complaint-based investigations may at times be supplemented by targeted inspections of specific industries (e.g., residential construction) or working situations (e.g., employers of migrant workers). Complaint-based enforcement has been adopted due to the limited resources allocated to OHS inspections relative to the number of employers in the jurisdiction. For example, in 2008, Alberta had 84 OHS inspectors to cover 144,000 employers.^[1]

The primary goal of workplace inspections is to achieve compliance with the OHS legislation. When a violation is found, a compliance order is normally issued that requires the employer to remedy the violation within a set timeline. (One exception to this norm is that stop-work orders are sometimes issued if the violation poses imminent danger of harm.) Given the limited budgets allocated to OHS inspection, a follow-up inspection may occur weeks later or not at all.

Research finds that inspections are up to 10 times more likely to occur in industrial and other so-called traditionally dangerous worksites (e.g., manufacturing, construction, mining) than other industries (e.g., education, health care, office environments). Forestry workers are 20 times more likely to be the subject of an inspection than nurses, despite the significant hazards faced by nurses (e.g., physical hazards associated with lifting, violence, exposure to biological hazards).^[2] Further, the vast majority of inspections are conducted during regular business hours (Monday to Friday, 9 to 5).^[3]

While OHS enforcement has changed over time, most of these changes have eroded the effectiveness of the system. In comparison to today, OHS enforcement in the 1970s and 1980s was more active: governments conducted more inspections, laid more charges, and achieved more convictions than they do today.^[4] The move away from active enforcement was caused by pushback from employers, who were unhappy with practices such as unannounced inspections, prosecutions, increased workers’ compensation premiums, and a growing list of prescriptive regulations, which stipulated specific requirements an employer must meet (e.g., standards for fall protection equipment).

In response, governments changed the roles that government, employers, and workers play in enforcement. While the details of this shift differ between jurisdictions, there is a clear pattern across Canada away from enforcement and toward education and collaboration. Governments conduct fewer unannounced inspections, implement intermediary steps before issuing compliance orders, and conduct fewer inspections and prosecutions overall. Employer groups have been given a larger role in drafting of regulations, which has shifted OHS from prescriptive regulations toward performance-based regulation, which identifies desired outcomes and leaves the specifics of how to achieve them to the employer.

Industry safety associations (ISAs), bodies formed by employers in an industry to deliver safety services and advocate on behalf of the employers on safety issues, have also achieved greater influence. ISAs have become more involved in establishing regulatory standards and delivering training and education to workers. In some jurisdictions, ISAs have been authorized to conduct workplace safety audits to determine eligibility for safety incentives, such as workers’ compensation premium reductions. Audits differ from inspections in that they do not identify hazards or non-compliance with regulations. Instead, audits assess whether a workplace has an appropriate safety system in place to deal with safety matters. They evaluate the quality of paper flows and communications systems, the presence of training and safety manuals, and whether appropriate paperwork is completed. Employers prefer audits to inspections, as audits are educative in nature rather than punitive.

Proponents of this shift (including employers, industry associations, safety professionals, and right-wing governments) assert that cooperation is a more effective way to achieve employer compliance. This assertion sits uncomfortably with the actual result of the partnership approach: employers have increased their control over safety in their workplaces and increased their influence over government policy. Research has shown that so-called tripartite consultations, which involve government, employers, and labour as equal partners at a table to discuss OHS issues, reproduce power imbalances and provide a structural advantage to employers in determining the shape of new safety regulations.^[5] The partnerships model of OHS works in concert with the professionalization of OHS to remove safety issues from the work floor, where workers are active agents, and place them in boardrooms, where workers become passive recipients of negotiated agreements between employers and governments.

The two sawmill explosions in British Columbia in 2012 (detailed in Chapters 1 and 9) help us understand the perils (for workers) of overly close relations between employers and the state. Shortly after the Babine sawmill blew up, an internal WorkSafeBC memo identified expected employer pushback as a reason to delay additional enforcement focused on reducing the risk of wood dust explosions:

• Industry sensitivity to the issue given the recent event and limited clarity around what constitutes an explosion could lead to push back if an enforcement strategy is pursued at this time.^[6]

Roughly 20 days later, the Lakeland mill exploded—due to wood dust accumulation. In effect, government concern about employer interests delayed enforcement action that might have saved workers’ lives. Box 11.3 examines how Alberta’s shift toward a partnership model set the stage for the regulatory capture of provincial OHS enforcement by employers. Overall, government decisions to shift away from active OHS enforcement in favour of collaborating with employers have profoundly undermined an important bulwark for workers against the power of the employers in the workplaces and further weakened the IRS.

How to get things done

Given the above discussion, one might be forgiven for being pessimistic about the prospects for safer and healthier workplaces. The shortcomings of the current OHS system are significant. Nevertheless, we should not lose sight of the fact that workplaces today are, in some ways, safer than they were 40 years ago and there is a higher degree of awareness of safety issues in the workplace. This suggests that it is possible for committed individuals (and groups of individuals) to make positive change in workplaces and in policy—even if the extent and speed of those changes is constrained by unfavourable circumstances.

Historically, workers made advances in health and safety when, armed with information, they mobilized collectively and politically.^[12] While this mobilization was not sustained when OHS energies were channelled into the structures and processes of the IRS regime, this history is informative. Specifically, it identifies the components of effective OHS advocacy, for workers, OHS activists, and safety professionals:

1. Education and information: Research has shown that, when workers are armed with information about the hazards they face and options for controlling them, they act upon this knowledge to the degree to which they are able.
2. Increasing power: Power in the workplace is essential to ensuring accurate and complete information is available and that workers can meaningfully act upon it. By recognizing the importance of power in OHS, we acknowledge that OHS advocacy must extend beyond technical arguments about safety and requires political action to create power.
3. Using the IRS: While the IRS has many shortcomings, effective advocates learn how to work within the IRS system as it exists and then supplement those actions with pressure from outside the system (e.g., via government enforcement, outside expertise, mobilization of workers)

Alan Hall and his colleagues have studied what makes worker representatives effective in OHS matters.^[13] Their research has identified three types of OHS activists:

1. Technical-legal representatives are well-informed workers who immerse themselves in the technical and legal aspects of OHS and perform those functions well. These workers typically act as if OHS is divorced from other labour-management issues and see their job as working with the employer to achieve solutions cooperatively.
2. Politically-active representatives, by contrast, understand well the power relations at work and see OHS as just another field of conflict with the employer. These workers tend to dismiss the importance of research and accurate information. As a result, while they are willing to engage the employer on OHS issues, they do not bring an independent source of information to their argument.

3. Knowledge-active representatives are thought to be the most effective activists because they recognize the political nature of OHS but also actively pursue independent and autonomous information to bolster both their legitimacy and their capacity to challenge the employer. They are also likely to equally divide their time between IRS-related activities (i.e., attending JHSC meetings, conducting inspections) and political activities (i.e., educating and mobilizing workers, engaging government enforcement).^[14] Box 11.4 provides a more detailed description of knowledge-active representatives.

This analysis suggests some practical ways in which a person (or group) can increase the effectiveness of OHS efforts. Workers who have access to a JHSC (or other OHS venue in their workplace) can improve safety by ensuring the worker representatives are informed and engaged. Safety practitioners and managers can improve JHSCs effectiveness by ensuring employer representatives are senior enough to have influence over how the organization responds to safety concerns. In addition, all actors can ensure there are clear meeting agendas, minutes, and timelines that are communicated to all workers, ongoing training of JHSC members, and that the members of the JHSC get out of the meeting room and regularly inspect the workplace and interact with workers.^[15]

Increasing workers’ input into (or autonomy over) training enhances workers’ knowledge of workplace hazards and control strategies. This undermines the employer’s ability to shape hazard identification and control through limiting what workers know. Allowing worker involvement may also result in training that is more engaging to participants and recognizes the varied motives workers have for participating in it. Worker-oriented training might also draw attention to psycho-social hazards in the workplace or the health effects of employment practices.

While OHS legislation and regulation have value, workers’ experience with the IRS is that it is not adequate to protect them or guarantee safe and healthy workplaces. One strategy for building upon the IRS is to entrench stronger levels of OHS protections in collective agreements and company policies. These protections might include enhanced participation rights, greater protection for refusals, and protection from reprisals. Similarly, OHS rights and obligations—such as conducting and publishing hazard assessments every time work processes change—can be incorporated into work routines. As part of this process, workers might encourage (or pressure) their employer to adopt the precautionary principle. For example, they might create an expectation that no new chemicals or processes will be introduced until the employer can demonstrate that the chemicals or processes do not create a hazard.

Finally, workers and OHS activists can draw upon political and economic power derived from collective action. We usually think of unions as the vehicle by which workers act collectively. For some workers, joining a union may well be a pathway to healthier and safer workplaces. Yet workers should be mindful of the history of OHS wherein change has come from groups of workers acting outside of established organizations—engaging in political lobbying, public demonstrations, and wildcat strikes. While trade unions can be a source of valuable resources, access to those resources often comes with an expectation that workers will act within the IRS. Given the limitations of the IRS, gaining union support may reduce the capacity of some workers to effect health and safety change.

Workers who cannot or do not want to join a union may rely on legal challenges to seek legislation that better protects their right to health. This right is found both within the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (which itself builds upon a more general right articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “Everyone has the right to work, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment”).^[16] Such legal strategies, while appealing, move conflict into the courts—yet another venue dominated by the employers and governments.

In the end, workers and OHS activists may well end up back where they began—cooperating with one another by sharing information, pooling resources, and politically agitating for safer workplaces. This is a lonely and dangerous path because, in capitalist economies, there is no necessary link between the interests of workers and employers around occupational health and safety. Defying the will of the employer and the state is risky. Yet perhaps better this risk (with its prospect of safer and healthier workplaces) than the certain risk of allowing employers to organize work as it suits their interests.